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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78 A-4-
103(2)(a) and Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
First Issue: Did the Appeal Board err by failing to consider whether the demotion 
of Petitioner was the proportionate and appropriate discipline for Petitioner's alleged 
conduct? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. The Appeal Board's failure to issue a finding on 
proportionality was legal error. This Court reviews an appeal board's "legal decisions for 
correctness." Howickv. SaltLake City Employee Appeals Bd., 2009 UT App 334, ]f 3,222 
P.3d 763 (citations omitted). 
Second Issue: Did the Appeal Board err in denying Petitioner's motion for adverse 
inference where the City was unable to produce requested physical evidence? 
Standard of Review: Generally speaking, "applying a specific standard of review for 
evidentiary rulings has proven problematic given the necessary analysis of factual issues, 
legal issues, and a mixture of both." Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 67 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). In this case, the Appeals Board did not identify a specific legal basis 
for denying Petitioner's motion. If the Appeals Board was required to grant Petitioner a 
favorable inference, then the appropriate standard of review ought to be one of correctness. 
If the Appeals Board had discretion to grant or reject the motion, then the appropriate 
1 
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standard of review is one of abuse of discretion. State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App 23 8, % 
14,166 P.3d 626. 
Third Issue: Did the Appeal Board exceed its authority and taint the proceedings by 
receiving and reviewing the City's proposed exhibits weeks before the hearing and even 
before the matter was formally appealed by Petitioner, which included documents that 
ultimately were not admitted at the hearing? 
Standard of Review: In determining whether the Appeal Board exceeded its authority, 
this court should review "for legal error, without deference." Tasters Ltd., Inc. v. Dept. of 
Employment Sec, 863 P.2d 12, 19 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Fourth Issue: Were the Appeal Board's findings upholding demotion of Petitioner 
supported by substantial evidence? 
Standard of Review: This Court's standard of review is whether the facts are 
supported by substantial evidence. Lucas v. Murray City Civil Serv. Comm >z, 949 P.2d 746, 
758 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statute is of central importance to the appeal: Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1106. The full text of this statute is included in Addendum attached hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 26, 2011, Petitioner Aaron Rosen ("Rosen") was demoted from his 
position as corporal of the City of Saratoga Springs Police Department ("City") to that of a 
2 
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top step officer, R 46-47. On March 7, 2011, R osen appealed his demotion •< - the Cit\ * >f 
Saratoga Springs Employee Appeals Boat d ( "' Appeal Boai d") pi irsi lantto I Jtah Code Ann. 
and April lv* JM'' '• K ^ On May io *0j ' r Appeal Board issued its decision 
upholding Ki^en s demotion. R .52 58 i Mi kuu1 "\ .V I Rosen filed a petition for review 
Docket. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Tanuarv 1 .v. sen was attempting to tuck . ;>.> ...,., torm slin i -\u- •*- pants 
t • I*'* • ur ; .| ifell to his knees R 2 ' i ->'% -M P K - - c e (if 
a male cc A orkci and a female cu -worker named Christy Soper ( "Sope r ' ) . iu. A l though 
R osen ' s shirttails covered any objectionable areas, Soper reported the incident R 24. The 
next da> on J anuai ) 19,20il 1, • • i• • - • M -.«• i1 .\ N C \ * ;.. • • a ;* a ^  i g i le d 
to investigate the matter . R. 2o . Ailei ouiaining Rose . <. YOIIK: <•*.. r-. ,\ • \ •. i .* . 
spoke to Rosen, about further contact w iih Soper R. " 1 **"7-C According to Sgt. Cole, 
Rosen was to id <•< mmi m s c o n t a d wi\u - u p e r t o ' p r o k ^ i o ^ a l contac t ' ' on ly Id. According 
January 18 incident or the corresponding investigation until it had been completed. R. 59: 
? 1
 1.15-315:6. T h e audio arid vide** . f l l ie interne^- 1v*\veen Rosen and Sg: C-.-le was 
recoru,„a,,> ::„: . , u n ^ a g i . >gi . . >le prepared a report contaiiniig Ins 
3 
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findings, it does not mention Sgt. Cole's alleged instruction to Rosen regarding contact with 
Soper. R. 26-28. 
On January 26, Rosen left circus tickets he had obtained by virtue of his part-time 
employment at a radio station in Soper's work mailbox. R. 3; 59: 322:8-14. The next day, 
Rosen noticed the tickets were no longer there and assumed Soper had taken and used them. 
R. 59:325:14-23. In fact, upon finding the tickets, Soper had immediately given them to Sgt. 
Cole. R. 59: 73: 14-17. 
On January 28, Rosen met with Chief Gary Hicken to discuss the disposition of Sgt. 
Cole's investigation. R. 28. Chief Hicken told Rosen he believed the January 18 incident 
had been an accident and issued Rosen a verbal counseling, the City's lowest form of 
discipline. R. 59: 327:21-25. Although Rosen had given Soper the circus tickets two days 
earlier, Chief Hicken did not mention them in the January 28 meeting. R. 59: 251:3-6. 
However, Chief Hicken gave Rosen permission to apologize to Soper. R. 59: 278:1-8. 
On January 31, Rosen attempted to apologize to Soper, but Soper left the room and 
avoided Rosen's efforts. R. 59: 83:7-16. On February 2, Rosen again met with Chief 
Hicken. R. 59: 252:23-253:23. This time, Chief Hicken spoke with Rosen about future 
contact with Soper. R. 59: 254:1-9. According to Chief Hicken, Rosen was told to have 
nothing but "professional contact" with Soper. Id. According to Rosen, Chief Hicken stated 
that Rosen would not be able to achieve a "resolution", that Rosen needed to "move on", 
should "let it go", act as if the January 18 incident had "never happened," and be professional 
4 
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in his contact with Soper. R. 59: 330:22-331:7, 333:21-25. 
On February 5, Rosen was working his part-time job at the radio station. R. 59: 
340:6-11. The radio station was holding a contest where individuals could call in and win 
tickets to an upcoming concert. R. 59: 338:16-25. Pursuant to an earlier request for event 
tickets by Soper, and as he had done many times in the past for other co-workers, Rosen 
reserved concert tickets for Soper and two other City employees. R. 59:323:8-10; 339:1-11. 
At that time, Soper's name was also inadvertently submitted into a database for the drawing 
of the contest's grand prize. R. 59:339:20-340:5. Through sheer coincidence, Soper's name 
was drawn, and Soper was identified on air as the winner of the grand prize. Id. Once the 
mistake was discovered, Soper's name was withdrawn, and she never received the concert 
tickets or the grand prize. R. 1L 
On February 7, the City placed Rosen on administrative leave while it conducted a 
second investigation into Rosen's contact with Soper since the January 18 incident. R. 59: 
341:5-7. Effective February 26,2011, Rosen was demoted from his position as corporal to 
that of a top step officer, which was accompanied by a reduction in Rosen's annual salary. 
R. 44-45, R. 59: 303:7-12. In the notice of demotion, the City asserted Rosen violated City 
policy when he (1) placed circus tickets in Soper's mailbox; and (2) entered Soper's name 
into the prize database. R. 45. The primary allegation was that in taking these actions, Rosen 
failed to follow direct orders by both Sgt. Cole and Chief Hicken to limit future contact with 
Soper to that of a professional nature. R. 44-45. No other reasons for the demotion were 
5 
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identified. Id. 
Rosen appealed the termination to the Appeal Board pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1106. R. 1. A two-day hearing before the Appeal Board was conducted on April 7 and 
April 19, 2011. R. 53. At the hearing, Rosen informed the Appeal Board that he had 
requested a recording of the January 19 interview with Sgt. Cole, and that Sgt. Cole had 
promised to produce it, but that the City had failed to do so. R. 59: 315:13-316:2; R. 59: 
319:3-25, 332:4-7. On that basis, Rosen moved for an adverse inference. Specifically, 
Rosen argued that the Appeal Board should infer from the City's failure to produce that the 
interview recording would have supported Rosen's position that he never received a no-
contact order from Sgt. Cole on January 19. R. 59: 39:13-40:2. The Appeal Board denied 
the motion, stating that the City's failure to produce was not intentional. R. 59: 50:5-7; 59: 
48:16-21. 
In a ruling dated May 10,2011, the Appeal Board upheld the demotion of Rosen. R. 
52-58. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. Proportionality. 
The Appeal Board was required to determine "whether discipline is appropriate and 
second whether the particular discipline meted out is proportionate to the offense." Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Com 'n„ 908 P.2d 871, 876 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
6 
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Rosen introduced proportionality evidence at the Appeal Board hearing, including a summary 
of all internal investigations that had been conducted within the department from 2007 to 
2011 and their corresponding discipline. However, the Appeal Board made no attempt to 
analyze the proportionality of Rosen's demotion and certainly did not comment on the 
evidence submitted by Rosen. As a result, the Appeal Board abused its discretion and its 
decision should be reversed. See Lucas, 949 P.2d at 763 (reversing termination decision, in 
part, based on "an abuse of the Chiefs discretion."). 
II. Adverse Inference. 
In civil matters, "a negative inference about missing documentation is to be drawn 
against the party who should have had possession of...the unproduced records". Keiter v. 
Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, \ 13, 235 P.3d 782. Rosen was disciplined in part because he 
allegedly violated Sgt. Cole's order of January 19. Rosen's recollection of the purported 
order was different. He thus requested the recording of the January 19 interview. The City 
failed to produce the recording and Rosen moved for an adverse inference. Rosen asked the 
Appeal Board to infer that Rosen's account of the January 19 interview was correct. The 
Appeal Board denied the motion, stating it did not believe the City had intentionally 
destroyed the evidence. 
The policy reasons for adverse inferences apply to appeal board hearings. Cities 
should be deterred from purposely destroying important evidence that would support 
employee defenses at appeal board hearings. In addition, cities should not be allowed to 
7 
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benefit from their inability to produce documentation they have lost or misplaced by simply 
substituting the evidence in question with the testimony of city witnesses. 
The Appeal Board's denial of Rosen's motion was error. That error prejudiced Rosen 
because the Appeal Board ultimately issued a finding that mirrored Sgt. Cole's account of 
the January 19 interview. Had the Appeal Board accepted Rosen's version of the January 
19 interview, the final outcome would likely have been different, as there is no dispute Rosen 
followed the directive he recalled receiving. Because the Appeal Board's actions constitute 
harmful error, its decision affirming the demotion should be reversed. See Lucas, 949 P.2d 
at 757 ("[A]n erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence does not constitute reversible 
error unless the error is harmful"). 
III. The Appeal Board Tainted the Proceeding by Reviewing Evidence in Advance, 
At the hearing on April 7, 2011, Rosen became aware for the first time that counsel 
for the City had sent a packet of proposed exhibits to the members of the Appeal Board at 
least a month prior to the hearing. The Appeal Board reviewed the City's proposed exhibits 
prior to the hearing and were "familiar with the facts" even before any witness had testified. 
These exhibits included documents that ultimately were not admitted at the hearing, 
including documents that discussed "older offenses" of Rosen that hadnot been identified by 
the City as bases for the demotion. 
The Appeal Board's early review of the evidence violated Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1106(3) and (4). Employees are afforded the right to "examine the evidence to be considered 
8 
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by the appeal board" and to seek the exclusion of objectionable evidence. Id. This suggests 
evidence should not be presented to an appeal board until the hearing, after the employee has 
had the opportunity to examine and object to the evidence. Several statements made by 
Appeal Board members indicate they were improperly influenced by having reviewed the 
City's evidence in advance. 
The Appeal Board's advance review of the City's evidence tainted the hearing and 
caused irreversible prejudice to Rosen. As a result, the Appeal Board's decision should be 
reversed or, in the alternative, the decision should be reversed and remanded for a new 
hearing. 
IV. Substantial Evidence, 
The Appeal Board upheld Rosen's demotion for various reasons; however, many of 
those findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 
The Appeal Board found that on January 19,2011, Sgt. Cole ordered Rosen to "have 
only 'professional' contact with [Soper]." R. 54. The Appeal Board found Rosen had 
violated this order by (1) leaving a circus ticket in Soper's work mailbox; and (2) responding 
to an email Soper had sent to all officers in the department. 
It was unreasonable for the Appeal Board to conclude that Sgt. Cole ordered Rosen 
to "have only 'professional' contact with [Soper]." R. 54. The City should have granted 
Rosen's motion for an adverse inference. In addition, Sgt. Cole's own direct testimony 
makes it clear he never gave Rosen an order. Sgt. Cole used the words "it would be best" 
9 
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in describing his statement to Rosen. These words are not consistent with an order or 
directive. 
The Appeal Board should not have considered the email from Rosen to Soper at all 
because that conduct was not stated as a reason for Rosen's demotion. When the City 
demoted Rosen, it delivered the Demotion Letter to Rosen. The Demotion Letter articulated 
two reasons for the demotion. The email was not one of them. The Appeal Board should 
have limited its consideration to the allegations identified in the Demotion Letter. 
The Appeal Board made two findings that have no factual support in the record. First, 
the Appeal Board found that on an unspecified date between January 19 and February 2, 
Rosen "was again instructed by Sgt. Cole to stay away from the [Soper] and to leave her 
alone" and "was instructed to give the situation time to cool off." R. 55. The Appeal Board 
also found that Chief Hicken met with officer Rosen on January 28, 2011, and "instructed 
him to limit his contact with [Soper] to 'professional' contact only." R. 55. Because it is 
impossible to determine whether the Appeal Board would have concluded Rosen was 
insubordinate but for its findings concerning non-existent orders, the only realistic remedy 
is to reverse or remand for a new hearing. 
The Appeal Board found that on February 2,2011, Chief Hicken instructed Rosen "to 
have nothing but professional contact with [Soper] and specifically, that Officer Rosen was 
not to try to resolve the issue any further with [Soper]." R. 55. The Appeal Board found 
Rosen violated this order when he "entered [Soper]'s name into a radio station give-away 
10 
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contest where he worked as a disc jockey" and Soper's name was announced over the air. 
R. 56. 
The Appeal Board's finding on this issue is not supported by substantial evidence 
because Rosen did not "contact" Soper after February 2. Furthermore, the undisputed 
evidence was that Soper's name was inadvertently entered into the prize database. It was a 
stretch and abuse of discretion for the Appeal Board to conclude Rosen's post-February 2 
actions constituted "contact" with Soper. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPEAL BOARD ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER WHETHER 
ROSEN'S DISCIPLINE WAS PROPORTIONATE TO THE ALLEGED 
OFFENSE. 
One of the most critical responsibilities of municipal appeal boards is to determine 
"whether discipline is appropriate and second whether the particular discipline meted out is 
proportionate to the offense." Salt Lake City Corp., 908 P.2d at 876. Indeed, in determining 
whether discipline is warranted, an appeal board must determine whether it is "(1) 
appropriate to the offense and (2) consistent with previous sanctions imposed by the [City]." 
Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 UT App 274, ^  16,116 P.3d 973. Reversal is appropriate 
if the sanction is "so clearly disproportionate to the charges as to amount to an abuse of the 
[City's] discretion." In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356, 1363 (Utah 1986). 
"When the [appeal board] determines...that the discipline meted out is 
disproportionate to the offense, it must reverse the department head's decision." Salt Lake 
11 
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City Corp., 908 P.2d at 876. 
At the hearing below, Rosen introduced proportionality evidence. One of the key 
pieces of evidence was a summary of all internal investigations that had been conducted 
within the department from 2007 to 2011, together with the corresponding discipline for each 
such investigation. R. 42-43. The evidence showed that the vast majority of all discipline 
meted out by the City- for all kinds of conduct - consisted of verbal reprimands and written 
reprimands. Chief Hicken acknowledged that his disciplinary options included "counseling, 
a supervisor's log,...an action plan,...additional training,...verbal counseling,...written 
reprimand...suspension, demotion, termination." R. 59:256:14-17.1 However, the City had 
never demoted an officer prior to Rosen.2 R. 59: 255:25-256:2. 
In its decision, the Appeal Board acknowledged Rosen's claim that "the discipline he 
received was not proportionate to his alleged offense nor was it consistent with other 
discipline meted out by the City." R. 52. But inexplicably, the Appeal Board made no 
1
 The City did introduce evidence to rebut Rosen's proportionality evidence. Chief 
Hicken testified that in the history of the Saratoga Springs Police Department there had never 
been an incident factually comparable to the one at issue. R. 59: 257:2-6. The Chief also 
testified that his department had never dealt with an incident where direct orders had been 
violated. R. 59: 258:18-259:1. 
2
 While the City had terminated two police officers in the past, the circumstances 
surrounding those incidents were substantially distinguishable from Rosen's circumstances. 
The first officer was a probationary employee and thus had no standing in his employment 
position. R. 59: 258:10-17. Furthermore, that officer had admitted to criminal conduct, not 
merely violating City policy. Id. The second officer had been placed on an action plan as 
an opportunity to correct the unwanted behavior. R. 59: 255:23-258:7. When that officer 
failed to correct his behavior, his employment was terminated. Id. 
12 
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attempt to analyze the proportionality of Rosen's demotion and certainly did not comment 
on the evidence submitted by Rosen.3 In this way, the Appeal Board failed to undertake one 
of its primary responsibilities, that of determining whether Rosen's discipline was 
"appropriate and...proportionate to the offense." Salt Lake City Corp., 908 P.2d at 876. 
Moreover, the Appeal Board failed to issue any findings of fact on proportionality. These 
failures warrant a reversal of the Appeal Board's decision and the reinstatement of Rosen. 
Findings of fact are necessary for both this Court and Rosen to experience a 
meaningful appeal. Indeed, "the importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings 
of fact is essential to a proper determination by an administrative agency." Milne Truck 
Lines, Inc. v. Public Services Com 'n of Utah, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986). Without 
findings of fact, this Court "cannot perform its duty of reviewing the [agency's] order in 
accordance with established legal principles and of protecting the parties and the public from 
arbitrary and capricious administrative action."4 Id. The failure to issue findings of fact on 
a material issue is, in and of itself, arbitrary and capricious: 
This court has emphasized that an administrative agency must make 
findings of fact that are sufficiently detailed so as to permit meaningful 
appellate review. For us to meaningfully review the Board's findings, 
3
 The Appeal Board concluded its analysis by simply stating: "The demotion of 
Officer Rosen from corporal to top step level police officer with accompanying reduction in 
pay is therefore upheld insofar as the decision was reasonable under the circumstances, and 
the discipline was warranted and supported by the evidence." R. 58. 
4
 Additionally, without findings of fact on proportionality, Rosen cannot fulfill his 
obligation of marshaling the evidence. 
13 
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the findings must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion of each 
factual issue was reached. The failure of an agency to make adequate 
findings of fact in material issues renders its findings arbitrary and 
capricious unless the evidence is clear, uncontroverted and capable of 
only one conclusion. 
Lucas, 949 P.2d at 755 n.5 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The proportionality 
evidence Rosen submitted could reasonably be viewed as showing Rosen was disciplined 
much more harshly than was the norm. At a minimum, the proportionality evidence was not 
clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion. Thus, the Appeal Board's 
unexplained determination that the demotion "was reasonable under the circumstances, and 
the discipline was warranted and supported by the evidence" was arbitrary and capricious. 
R. 58. 
This court has equated arbitrary and capricious action on the part of an appeal board 
with an abuse of discretion. See Lucas, 949 P.2d at 755 n.5 (finding civil service 
commission's granting of motion "without providing any findings, conclusions, or reasoning 
was arbitrary and capricious" and, therefore, an abuse of discretion). Where an appeal board 
abuses its discretion, reversal is the proper remedy. Id., at 763 (reversing termination 
decision, in part, based on "an abuse of the Chiefs discretion."); see also Burr v. DepL of 
Corrections, 2005 WL 851653, *1 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (unreported). 
Furthermore, it is axiomatic that this Court will reverse an agency's findings of fact 
"if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Fragomeno v. Dept. of 
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Workforce Services, 2011 UT App 100, f 2, 250 P.3d 1043; citing Drake v. Industrial 
Conim'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). In other words, reversal is proper where an 
agency's findings of fact differ from the evidence that was actually introduced. It follows, 
then, that this Court should reverse an appeal board's implicit conclusion on proportionality 
when the board fails to make any findings at all on that issue. 
II. THE APPEAL BOARD ERRED BY DENYING ROSEN'S MOTION FOR 
ADVERSE INFERENCE WITH RESPECT TO THE AUDIO RECORDING 
THE CITY FAILED TO PRESERVE AND/OR PRODUCE. 
On January 19, 2011, Rosen was interviewed by Sgt. Cole, who was assigned to 
investigate the January 18 incident. After obtaining Rosen's account, Sgt. Cole spoke to 
Rosen about further contact with Soper. Sgt. Cole testified that during the discussion he 
ordered Rosen to limit contact with Soper to "professional contact" only. On the other hand, 
Rosen testified that Sgt. Cole had only instructed him not to discuss the January 18 incident 
or pending investigation until the investigation had been completed. The audio and video 
of the interview between Rosen and Sgt. Cole were recorded by the City. 
At the hearing, Rosen informed the Appeal Board that he had requested a recording 
of the January 19 interview with Sgt. Cole but that the City had failed to produce it. The City 
acknowledged on the record that at one time it had the recording, but that it had been unable 
to locate it. R. 59: 167:10-168:7. On that basis, Rosen moved for an adverse inference, 
contending that from the City's failure to produce the recorded interview, the Appeal Board 
should infer that the interview, if produced, would support Rosen's position that Sgt. Cole 
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had not issued a "professional contact only" order. Rosen further clarified that according to 
Utah case law, the reasons behind the inability to produce were irrelevant, and that it did not 
matter whether the destruction or misplacement of evidence was intentional or not. R. 59: 
49:1-13. 
The Appeal Board denied the motion, stating: "So intentionally being destroyed, I'm 
not sure that's a possibility or that's not what happened. So I think as a group, I don't think 
we are going to look at that, even though there's case law that we are going to look at that 
negatively..." R. 59:48:16-21. The Appeal Board also held that it would allow Sgt. Cole to 
simply testify as to what instructions he gave Rosen during the January 19 interview. R. 59: 
50:8-17. 
The testimony elicited at the hearing following the Appeal Board's denial of the 
motion supported Rosen's motion for an adverse inference. Sgt. Cole testified that although 
the interview had been recorded, he had thereafter been unable to locate the recording: 
Cole: The room is recorded audibly and visually, and it's an 
automatic recording system. You don't have to turn 
anything on. That's going 24/7, and it's on a loop. So 
whatever you record, you go back and you pull that piece 
of information off.... 
Q. Was this particular interview with [Rosen] recorded? 
Cole: I'm sure it was, yes. 
Q. Were you able to locate it? 
Cole: I was not able to locate it on the recording, and I have to 
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admit I didn't go back and check a second and third time. 
... It did get recorded, I believe. I was not able to find it. 
I did not make a copy of the recording. 
R. 59: 167:12-168:7. Rosen testified that he had directed a written request for a copy of the 
recording in question to Sgt. Cole. R. 59:315:13-23. Sgt. Cole responded that the recording 
should still be on the computer and that he would make it available to Rosen. R. 59:315:25-
316:2. Nevertheless, the recording was never produced. 
In civil matters, the failure to preserve evidence is governed by Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(g), which states in relevant part: 
Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits the inherent 
power of the court to take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2) 
if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or fails to preserve a 
document, tangible item, electronic data or other evidence in violation 
of a duty. 
Rule 37(b)(2) states in relevant part: "the court in which the action is pending may take such 
action in regard to the failure as are just, including the following: deem the matter or any 
other designated facts to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the 
claim of the party obtaining the order..." 
Utah Rule of Evidence 1002 states that "[a]n original writing, recording, or 
photograph is required in order to prove its content..." Utah Rule of Evidence 1004 states: 
An original is not required and other evidence of the content of a 
writing, recording, or photograph is admissible if: (a) all the originals 
are lost or destroyed, and not by the proponent acting in bad faith; (b) 
an original cannot be obtained by any available judicial process; (c) the 
party against whom the original would be offered had control of the 
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original; was at that time put on notice, by pleadings or otherwise, that 
the original would be a subject of proof at the trial or hearing; and 
fails to produce it at the trial or hearing] or (d) the writing, recording, 
or photograph is not closely related to a controlling issue. 
(Emphasis added). With respect to missing evidence, the Utah Supreme Court has clearly 
stated as follows: 
[E]ven in cases where the failure to procure [evidence] is inadvertent, 
the only fair way to address the missing evidence is to direct the fact-
finder that the [requesting party] [is] entitled to a favorable inference 
in place of the missing evidence. This remedy will serve the dual 
purpose of mitigating any prejudice experienced by the [the requesting 
party] and providing a sufficient deterrent to others who may be 
tempted to purposely destroy important evidence. 
Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82, f^ 39, 199 P.3d 957; see also Keiter, 
2010 UT App 169 at \ 13 ("a negative inference about missing documentation is to be drawn 
against the party who should have had possession of...the unproduced records"). Each of 
these authorities was identified by Rosen to the Appeal Board, yet Rosen's motion was still 
denied. R. 59:40:1-7. 
Although appeal boards are not strictly bound by either the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure or the Utah Rules of Evidence, the policy considerations behind those rules apply 
equally to appeal board hearings. Cities should be deterred from purposely destroying 
important evidence that would support employee defenses at appeal board hearings. They 
should further be prohibited from benefitting from a failure to disclose critical evidence -
whether inadvertent or not - by simply substituting the evidence in question with the 
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testimony of witnesses. This is particularly true in administrative actions that do not provide 
for formal discovery or depositions and where rules of evidence are already relaxed. 
The Appeal Board's denial of Rosen's motion was error. Moreover, the error 
prejudiced Rosen because ultimately the Appeal Board issued a finding that mirrored Sgt. 
Cole's account of his January 19 instruction to Rosen. Had the Appeal Board accepted the 
version of the January 19 order most favorable to Rosen - that Sgt. Cole merely instructed 
Rosen not to discuss the investigation with Soper until it was completed - the final outcome 
would likely have been markedly different, as there is no dispute Rosen followed that 
directive. Because the Appeal Board's actions constitute harmful error, its decision affirming 
the demotion should be reversed. See Lucas, 949 P.2d at 757 ("[A]n erroneous decision to 
admit or exclude evidence does not constitute reversible error unless the error is harmful."). 
III. THE APPEAL BOARD EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY AND TAINTED THE 
PROCEEDINGS BY RECEIVING AND REVIEWING THE CITY'S 
PROPOSED EXHIBITS IN ADVANCE OF THE HEARING. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(3)(b)(ii) states: "Upon receipt of the referral from the 
municipal recorder, the appeal board shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and 
receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the 
discharge, suspension, or transfer." Subsection (4) states: 
An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or 
transfer may: (a) appear in person and be represented by counsel; (b) 
have a public hearing; (c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be 
considered; and (d) examine the evidence to be considered by the 
appeal board. 
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(Emphasis added). The language "examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal 
board" suggests that the evidence should not be presented to the appeal board until the time 
of the hearing when the employee has the opportunity to examine such evidence and 
determine whether it is objectionable. At that time, the employee would have the opportunity 
to seek the exclusion of objectionable evidence. 
Here, Rosen was afforded no such opportunity. At the hearing on April 7, 2011, 
Rosen became aware for the first time that counsel for the City had sent a packet of proposed 
exhibits to the members of the Appeal Board at least a month prior to the hearing. R. 59: 
16:20-17:1 The Appeal Board admitted that it had received and reviewed the City's 
proposed exhibits prior to the hearing and that they were "familiar with the facts" even before 
any witness had testified. Id. These exhibits included documents that ultimately were not 
admitted at the hearing, including documents that discussed "older offenses" of Rosen that 
had transpired well prior to the January 18 incident in question, and had not been identified 
by the City as bases for the demotion at issue. R. 59: 37:5-14. After a discussion on the 
matter, the City ultimately agreed it would "not bring in the older offenses" and would limit 
the evidence to the conduct that transpired from January 18,2011 and forward. R. 59: 37:9-
14. 
Unfortunately, by that time the damage had been done. At least one board member 
expressed some concern over the prior allegations5, stating "I'm trying not to let the whole 
5
 The prior allegations also involved wardrobe malfunctions. 
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pants thing bother me and influence me. But I've got one hand, and my pants aren't falling 
down all the time." R. 59: 20:22-25. Another board member commented on Rosen's guilt 
before any evidence had been presented, stating: "It seems to me that we are talking about 
insubordination, and he was insubordinate in my opinion - or allegedly." R. 59: 24:9-11. 
Because no evidence had yet been submitted, the board member could only have been basing 
his opinion of guilt from his review of the City's materials. 
Rosen submits that the Appeal Board's advance review of the City's evidence, much 
of which was objected to and never introduced, tainted the hearing and caused irreversible 
prejudice to Rosen. Furthermore, the City's providing of the evidence ahead of time violated 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. For these reasons, the Appeal Board's decision should be 
reversed or, in the alternative, the decision should be reversed and remanded for a new, 
impartial hearing. 
IV, MANY OF THE APPEAL BOARD'S FINDINGS WERE NOT SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
In upholding the demotion, the Appeal Board made several factual findings against 
Rosen. This Court should review those findings using a substantial evidence standard and 
in light of the entire record. Lucas, 949 P.2d at 758. Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence a reasonable mind "might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Allen v. 
Dept. of Workforce Services, 2005 UT App 186, | 18, 112 P.3d 1238. Reversal is 
appropriate if the Appeal Board's findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Drake, 
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939P.2dat 181. 
In this case, the Appeal Board upheld Rosen's demotion for various reasons. The 
Appeal Board's findings, discussed in turn below, are not supported by substantial evidence. 
A. Sgt. Cole's January 19 Statement Was Not an Order. 
The Appeal Board found that on or about January 19,2011, Sgt. Cole ordered Rosen 
to "have only 'professional' contact with [Soper]." R. 54. The Appeal Board found that 
Rosen had violated this order on two separate occasions: 
On or about January 25, 2011, Officer Rosen left a Circus ticket with 
a hand-written note affixed to it for [Soper] in her Department box. 
The note said, "Sorry so late!- Enjoy." [Soper] reported the ticket to 
her supervisor. (Ex. 2.) Officer Rosen acknowledged in his testimony 
that he left the Circus ticket for [Soper] in her Department box, with the 
handwritten note attached. 
R. 54. 
On or about January 26, 2011, [Soper] issued a Department-wide 
interoffice email requesting information relating to a license plate issue. 
Officer Rosen emailed a response to [Soper] in an effort to 
communicate with her. (Ex. 3.) Officer Rosen acknowledged in his 
testimony that he sent the responsive email despite that he had no 
pertinent information about the license plate which was the subject of 
[Soper]'s email. 
R. 54-55. Consistent with Rosen's obligation to marshal the evidence, the following 
testimony was adduced at the hearing in support of the Appeal Board's finding on this issue: 
1. Sgt. Cole testified that he "told [Rosen]...it would be best if you don't have any 
contact with her,...only have professional contact with her, nothing away from that." 
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R. 59: 173:7-12. 
2. In an interview conducted at POST on February 11,2011, Sgt. Cole had the following 
exchange with Rosen regarding the January 19 order: 
Cole: And at the very end of that, I gave you a directive. Do 
you remember what that was? 
Rosen: I don't. Basically what I recall was you said that I have 
no — to not talk about it or have any dealings with it, and 
that the chief would get back with me on it and explain 
what was going to happen from there as far as that. 
Cole: Okay. You don't remember I said to you, you shouldn't 
talk to [Soper] unless it's business, professional? 
Rosen: On a professional level. 
Cole: Right. 
Rosen: Right. 
Cole: Do you remember that? 
Rosen: Yeah. 
R. 59: 176:6-21. 
3. Sgt. Cole testified he told Soper and Kim Wright, Soper's supervisor, that Rosen 
"couldn't have contact with [Soper]," but Sgt. Cole couldn't remember his exact 
words. R. 59: 177:12-178:2. 
4. Soper testified that Sgt. Cole told her Rosen "was to have no contact with [Soper] at 
all. And that if any contact was made or anything happened, that [Soper] was to 
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directly report to [Sgt. Cole]. R. 59: 69:5-8. 
5. Kim Wright testified that Sgt. Cole told her that "there should be no contact 
whatsoever between [Rosen and Soper]." R. 59: 143:3-7. [Delete??] 
6. On January 25,20119 Rosen left circus tickets in Soper's work mailbox. R. 3. Rosen 
did not dispute this. 
7. On January 26,2011, Rosen replied to Soper's work-related email stating "Omgosh!!! 
That's hysterical! I figured we could leave it there to see how long it would be before 
it starts to disintegrate!? You have a smashing day too- thanks for the smile!" R. 4. 
Again, Rosen did not dispute this. 
Notwithstanding the above, it was unreasonable for the Appeal Board to conclude that 
on January 19 Sgt. Cole ordered Rosen to "have only 'professional' contact with [Soper]." 
R. 54. First, had the City produced the recording of the January 19 hearing, the parties and 
Appeal Board would not have been in the position of trying to recollect what had been said 
months prior. For the reasons stated supra, the Appeal Board should have granted Rosen's 
motion for an adverse inference and given credence to Rosen's accounting of the 
conversation. 
Moreover, Sgt. Cole's own direct testimony makes it clear he never gave Rosen an 
order. Sgt. Cole testified that when he instructed Rosen to have only professional contact 
with Soper, he further explained that the instruction was to remain in place "until this was 
resolved." R. 59:203:16-22. Sgt. Cole believed that resolution occurred when he submitted 
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his findings concerning the January 18 incident to Chief Hicken. R. 59:203:23-204:23. Sgt. 
Cole also used the words "it would be best" in describing his statement to Rosen.6 Although 
those words are consistent with advice or a recommendation, they are not consistent with an 
order or directive. If Sgt. Cole's statement could best be described as advice or a 
recommendation, Rosen could not have committed insubordination by failing to heed it. 
Even assuming Sgt. Cole's statement was an order, the Appeal Board should not have 
considered the January 26 email from Rosen to Soper in its analysis of whether the order was 
violated because that conduct was not stated as a reason for Rosen's demotion. On February 
16,2011, the City issued a letter of intent to discipline ("Demotion Letter"), identifying the 
conduct for which Rosen was being demoted. R. 44-45. The Demotion Letter only 
identified two allegations: (1) placing of the circus tickets in Soper's mailbox; and (2) 
entering Soper's name in the radio contest. Id. No other allegations of insubordination were 
identified in the Demotion Letter. 
The authority of an appeal board is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106: 
The board shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive 
evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the 
cause for the discharge .... 
(Emphasis added). Thus, in a case of employee discipline, an appeal board's role is to 
consider the merits of the underlying cause for that discipline. It stands to reason that where 
6
 Sgt. Cole testified he told Rosen "it would be best if you don't have any contact with 
her,...only have professional contact with her, nothing away from that." R. 59: 173:7-12. 
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a municipality has articulated specific reasons for the discipline {i.e., the "cause" of the 
discipline) in a discipline letter or other document, the appeal board can only consider 
evidence regarding those stated reasons. On the other hand, the language of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-3-1106 can only mean that an appeal board exceeds its authority if it considers 
additional "reasons" not articulated in the relevant disciplinary documentation. 
This interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 is consistent with the fundamental 
requirements of due process, which is triggered because Rosen has a recognized property 
right in his job. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(1). "Due process, at a minimum, requires 
timely notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case". Becker v. 
Sunset City, 2009 UT App 197, f 7,216 P.3d 367 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
When the City demoted Rosen, the only notice Rosen received was the Demotion Letter. 
Consequently, Rosen only received proper due process with respect to the allegations 
outlined in that letter. 
Furthermore, with respect to agency action "due process ... requires that the 
[individual] know what information the [agency] will be considering at the hearing and that 
the [individual] know soon enough in advance to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare 
responses and rebuttal of inaccuracies." Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 
909 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added). Thus, Rosen received proper due process to the extent 
he had the opportunity to prepare a defense against the allegations outlined in the Demotion 
Letter. 
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At the hearing, Rosen asserted the evidence of the January 26 email was improper and 
that the Appeal Board should limit its consideration to the allegations identified in the 
Demotion Letter. R. 59: 519:1-11. Instead, the Appeal Board did consider the email and 
issued a specific finding indicating that action violated the orders given to Rosen. R. 54-55. 
Because the Appeal Board improperly exceeded its authority in considering reasons 
unrelated to Rosen's demotion, Rosen respectfully submits the Appeal Board's ruling is 
fatally flawed. Indeed, it is impossible to determine what the Appeal Board's decision would 
have been had it not considered evidence of the email. For these reasons, this Court should 
reverse the Appeal Board's decision and reinstate Rosen to the position of corporal. Turner 
v. Lone Peak Public Safety Dist., 2010 UT App 168, f 1, 235 P.3d 797 (On appeal, reversal 
is appropriate if the Appeal Board "abused its discretion or exceeded its authority"). 
B. Sgt Cole Did Not Give a Second Order to Rosen. 
The Appeal Board found that Rosen violated Sgt. Cole's January 19 order, as well as 
Chief Hicken's February 2 order. However, the Appeal Board also found that on an 
unspecified date between January 19 and February 2, Rosen "was again instructed by Sgt. 
Cole to stay away from [Soper] and to leave her alone" and "was instructed to give the 
situation time to cool off." R. 55. This finding is meaningful because it references alleged 
insubordinate conduct, precisely the kind of conduct for which Rosen was demoted. 
Critically, however, the record is devoid of any evidence supporting such a finding. 
Although Sgt. Cole testified he ordered Rosen to limit his contact with Soper on 
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January 195 he never testified about a purported second order. R. 26; R. 59: 173:7-12. 
According to the record, the next time Sgt. Cole spoke to Rosen about Soper was in a 
February 11 interview, after all of the alleged misconduct had already occurred and Rosen 
had been placed on administrative leave. R. 31, 50. Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
determine whether the Appeal Board would have arrived at the same conclusions concerning 
insubordination had it not believed Rosen violated a non-existent order. Under the 
circumstances, the only realistic remedy is to reverse or remand for a new hearing. 
C. Chief Hicken Did Not Issue a No-contact Order on January 28. 
It is bad enough that the Appeal Board made one finding that was unsupported by the 
record. However, the Appeal Board also made a second finding based entirely on phantom 
evidence: 
On or about January 28, 2011, Chief Hicken met with officer Rosen 
regarding the pants incident ant to close the IA investigation. During 
that meeting, he verbally counseled Officer Rosen and instructed him 
to limit his contact with [Soper] to "professional" contact only. 
R. 55. This finding is not supported by even a scrap of evidence. On the contrary, Chief 
Hicken testified he did not recall speaking to Rosen about making contact with Soper prior 
to February 2. R. 59:252:10-14. He further testified that as far as he was concerned, any no-
contact directive issued by Sgt. Cole on January 19 would have terminated as of January 28. 
R. 59: 250:4-251:2. While Chief Hicken described his "professional contact" directive of 
February 2, he provided no testimony of a prior, similar directive. All of this is consistent 
with Chief Hicken's admission that during the January 28 discussion, Chief Hicken actually 
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gave Rosen permission to speak to Soper. R. 59: 278:1-5. 
Again, it is impossible to determine whether the Appeal Board would have arrived at 
the same conclusions concerning insubordination had it not believed Rosen violated a non-
existent order; therefore, reversal or remand is the only appropriate remedy. 
Chief Hicken's February 2 Order Was Not Violated. 
The Appeal Board found on February 2,2011, Chief Hicken instructed Rosen "to have 
nothing but professional contact with [Soper] and specifically, that Officer Rosen was not 
to try to resolve the issue any further with [Soper]." R. 55. The Appeal Board found that 
Rosen violated this order: 
[A]fter the meeting with Chief Hicken, Officer Rosen nonetheless 
engaged in further contact with [Soper] which was not limited to 
"professional" contact as directed. On or about February 5, 2011 and 
after him meeting with Chief Hicken, Officer Rosen entered [Soper]'s 
name into a radio station give-away contest where he worked as a disc 
jockey. [Soper] won the contest and her name was read over the air as 
the winner of "Riverdance" tickets. Officer Rosen admitted this 
conduct during his testimony. 
R. 56. The following testimony was adduced at the hearing in support of the Appeal Board's 
finding on this issue: 
1. Chief Hicken testified that on February 2 he told Rosen that "there's to be no contact 
other than professional contact, which would mean, you know, if she had some record 
issues or something you normally do as a police officer in the field. That would be 
it. Everything else would be unacceptable." R. 59: 254:3-9. 
2. On February 7, 2011, Chief Hicken sent an email to Sgt. Cole stating: 
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On Feb. 2nd I ordered Cpl. Rosen to have no further contact with...Soper 
regarding the IA case in which he was disciplined... I ordered him to 
have nothing but professional contact with her and nothing else...This 
was clear and unmistakable direction. Anything which falls outside of 
"professional contact" can be considered a violation of a direct order. 
R.21. 
3. On February 5, 2011, Rosen reserved concert tickets for Soper and two other co-
workers and Soper's name was inadvertently submitted into a database for the 
drawing of the contest's grand prize. R. 59: 339:1-11, R. 59: 339:20-340:5. 
4. Soper's name was drawn, and Soper was identified on air as the winner of the grand 
prize. Id. 
The Appeal Board's finding on this issue is not supported by substantial evidence 
because entering Soper's name into a contest does not equate to "contact".7 Furthermore, the 
undisputed evidence was that Soper's name was inadvertently entered into the prize database. 
Specifically, during the course of his investigation, Sgt. Cole emailed a radio station 
employee about the incident. Sgt. Cole testified that, according to the employee, Soper's 
name had been "mistakenly" put into the prize drawing. R. 59: 194:18-196:6. It was a 
stretch and abuse of discretion for the Appeal Board to conclude that entering Soper's name 
into a contest constituted "contact" with Soper. 
7
 On February 7,2011, Rosen stated to Soper "congratulations, you got tickets to River 
Dance...you won them through K-Bull 93." R. 59: 337:20-25. However, Rosen was never 
disciplined for making this statement, as the City did not mention it in the Demotion Letter. 
Furthermore, the Appeal Board did not make a finding concerning the February 7 
conversation or give any indication that it factored into the Appeal Board's decision. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Aaron Rosen respectfully requests that he be 
reinstated to his former position as corporal with the City of Saratoga Springs Police 
Department, together with applicable back pay and benefits from February 26,2011, the date 
of his demotion. 
™W DATED this ^> day of December 2011. 
KESLER&jRUST 
R: 
Attome\>sl for Aaron Rosen 
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10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer — Appeals — Board — 
Procedure. 
(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, suspended without pay, or 
involuntarily transferred to a position with less remuneration: 
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or 
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or heads of departments. 
(2) (a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without pay, or involuntarily 
transferred from one position to another with less remuneration for any reason, the employee may, subject to 
Subsection (2)(b), appeal the discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a board to be known as 
the appeal board, established under Subsection (7). 
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall exhaust the employee's 
rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to the board. 
(3) (a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the 
municipal recorder within 10 days after: 
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee receives notice of the final 
disposition of the municipality's internal grievance procedure; or 
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the discharge, suspension, or 
involuntary transfer. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder shall forthwith refer a copy 
of the appeal to the appeal board. 
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board shall forthwith commence its 
investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the 
discharge, suspension, or transfer. 
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may: 
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel; 
(b) have a public hearing; 
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and 
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board. 
(5) (a) (i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to the recorder 
within 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it, except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii). 
(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection (5)(a)(i) to a maximum of 60 
days, if the employee and municipality both consent. 
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the employee shall receive: 
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is discharged or suspended without 
pay; or 
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was transferred to a position of less 
remuneration. 
(6) (a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals by filing with that 
court a petition for review. 
(b) Each petition under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the issuance of the final action or 
order of the appeal board. 
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal board and for the 
purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its authority. 
(7) (a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, the number of members, the 
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designation of their terms of office, and the procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall 
be prescribed by the governing body of each municipality by ordinance. 
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a council-mayor form under Chapter 
3b, Part 2, Council-Mayor Form of Municipal Government, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a) may 
provide that the governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board. 
Amended by Chapter 19, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 115, 2008 General Session 
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CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS 
EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD 
IN RE: 
APPEAL OF AARON ROSEN 
DECISION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1106 and in accordance with City Policies, Section X; 114 
("Employee Appeal Process'7), the Employee Appeals Board of the City of Saratoga Springs ("EAB") 
hereby UPHOLDS the decision to demote Officer Rosen from corporal to top step level police officer 
with an accompanying reduction in pay. 
Upon review of the evidence presented at the hearing and on review of the recording of the 
pre-disciplinary hearing which was submitted by the parties to the EAB for review post-hearing, the EAB 
issues its Findings and Decision as follows: 
PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant Aaron Rosen is an officer and full time employee of the Saratoga Springs City (the 
"City") Police Department. Officer Rosen filed an appeal of the decision of the City Police Department 
(the "Department") and Chief Gary Hicken (the "Chief7) to demote him from corporal to top step police 
officer with an accompanying decrease in pay. Officer Rosen's basis for appeal was two-fold: 1) He was 
not given an order and he was not insubordinate; and, 2) the discipline he received was not 
proportionate to his alleged offense nor was it consistent with other discipline meted out by the City. 
Officer Rosen filed his written appeal with the City Recorder within ten (10) days of the City and the 
Chiefs disciplinary action according to the City's appeal procedures. That written appeal was forwarded 
to the EAB. 
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On April 7 and April 19, 2011, a hearing was held before the EAB at which Officer Rosen and his 
counsel, Ryan Hancey of Kestler & Rust were present. Also present was the City and its counsel, Lindsay 
Jarvis. During the course of proceedings, the EAB was advised by independent counsel, Elizabeth M. 
Peck of Peck Law, LLC. The EAB took and received evidence, and it fully heard the matter before 
rendering its decision. The EAB also heard argument of Officer Rosen's and the City's counsel at the 
opening and close of evidence on the matter. Following the hearings and upon review of the exhibits 
submitted during the course of the hearings, the EAB rendered its decision by secret ballot according to 
City policy and Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1106. 
EAB FINDINGS 
Based on the evidence presented to the EAB at the hearings on April 7 and 19, 2011, the EAB 
makes the following findings: 
1. On or about January 18, 2011, Officer Rosen was involved in an incident where a female 
coworker complained to the City that Officer Rosen (then, Corporal Rosen) had dropped his pants in a 
public location within the Department offices where others, including the co-worker, could view him 
(the "pants incident"). (Ex. 1.) The co-worker testified about the pants incident, her complaint, and 
about Officer Rosen's subsequent efforts to communicate and make contact with her. 
2. In his testimony to the EAB, Officer Rosen acknowledged his condict in regards to the 
pants incident, but he described the conduct as an accidental "wardrobe malfunction" that occurred 
when he unbuckled his pants to tuck in his uniform shirt and the pants inadvertently dropped below his 
waist. Officer Rosen also submitted a written response in regards to the pants incident during the IA 
investigation which subsequently ensued. (Ex.6.) 
I Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. At the time of the pants incident, Officer Rosen was already undergoing another 
unrelated Internal Affairs ("IA") investigation; the first IA investigation resulted in a verbal warning. 
4. The Chief testified that the pants incident caused "the biggest disruption in the 
Department's history." 
5. On or about January 19, 2011, a second IA investigation was commenced regarding the 
pants incident: IA-11-003. Sgt. Kerry Cole was the investigating officer. Sgt. Cole testified that during his 
investigation, he informed Officer Rosen to have only "professional" contact with the complaining co-
worker. 
6. The IA investigation into the pants incident also resulted in a Disciplinary Report and 
corrective action of a verbal reprimand on or about January 28, 2011 to Officer Rosen for violation of 
Department Rules and Regulations 2.0 Personal Conduct. (Ex. 12.) 
7. After Officer Rosen was directed by Sgt, Cole to limit his contact with the co-worker to 
"professional contact" only, Officer Rosen nonetheless continued to make contact with the female co-
worker which was not "professional." Evidence of Officer Rosen's contact efforts with the co-worker 
was presented to show the following: 
a. On or about January 25, 2011, Officer Rosen left a Circus ticket with a hand-written 
note affixed to it for the co-worker in her Department box. The note said, "Sorry so 
late! -Enjoy." The co-worker reported the ticket to her supervisor. (Ex. 2.) Officer 
Rosen acknowledged in his testimony that he left the Circus ticket for the co-worker 
in her Department box, with the handwritten note attached. 
b. On or about January 26, 2011, the co-worker issued a Department-wide interoffice 
email requesting information relating to a license plate issue. Officer Rosen emailed 
& 
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a response to the co-worker in an effort to communicate with her. (Ex. 3.) Officer 
Rosen acknowledged in his testimony that he sent the responsive email despite that 
he had no pertinent information about the license plate which was the subject of 
the co-worker's email. 
8. Officer Rosen was again instructed by Sgt. Cole to stay away from the co-worker and to 
leave her alone. He was instructed to give the situation time to cool off. 
9. On or about January 28, 2011, Chief Hicken met with Officer Rosen regarding the pants 
incident and to close the IA investigation. During that meeting, he verbally counseled Officer Rosen and 
instructed him to limit his contact with the co-worker to "professional" contact only. During that 
meeting the Chief also agreed to allow Officer Rosen to apologize to the co-worker. Chief Hicken 
testified that he was unaware of the contacts made by Officer Rosen on or about January 25 and 26, 
2011. 
10. In the January 28, 2011 meeting, Chief Hicken agreed that Officer Rosen could apologize 
to the co-worker, which Officer Rosen tried to do on or about January 31, 2011. However, the co-
worker testified that she refused Officer Rosen's request to meet with her to apologize because she did 
not want his apology or contact with Officer Rosen. 
11. Chief Hicken testified that he met with Officer Rosen again on February 2, 2011, after 
Chief Hicken learned of the contacts made by Officer Rosen and his efforts to apologize. During the 
February 2, 2011 meeting, Chief Hicken instructed Officer Rosen to have no further contact with the co-
worker regarding the IA case and pants incident. He further instructed Officer Rosen to have nothing 
but professional contact with the co-worker and specifically, that Officer Rosen was not to try to resolve 
the issue any further with the co-worker. The Chief also testified that he sent an email to Sgt. Cole on or 
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about February 7, 2011 regarding his meeting with Officer Rosen explaining the instructions he gave to 
Officer Rosen on February 2, 2011; that email was introduced at the hearing. (Ex. 9.) 
12. Officer Rosen acknowledged in his testimony that Chief Hicken directed him to have 
only professional contact with the co-worker. However, after meeting with Chief Hicken, Officer Rosen 
nonetheless engaged in further contact with the co-worker which was not limited to "professional" 
contact as directed. 
13. On or about February 5, 2011 and after his meeting with Chief Hicken, Officer Rosen 
entered the co-worker's name into a radio station give-away contest where he worked as a disc jockey. 
The co-worker won the contest and her name was read over the air as the winner of "Riverdance" 
tickets. Officer Rosen admitted this conduct during his testimony. 
14. Officer Rosen acknowledged that on or about February 16, he was issued a letter of 
intent to discipline by the Chief. (Ex. 17.) He further testified that on or about February 24, 2011, 
Officer Rosen participated in a pre-disciplinary hearing with the Chief and City counsel, Lindsay Jarvis. 
Officer Rosen acknowledged that he recorded the pre-disciplinary hearing, and that recording was 
presented to the EAB for review post-hearing. 
15. Officer Rosen was issued a final discipline in the form of demotion from corporal to top 
step police officer with accompanying reduction in pay. 
16. Officer Rosen acknowledged having voluntarily issued a written statement to his co-
workers regarding his demotion in which he acknowledged his conduct, his demotion, and he apologized 
for the disruption he caused within the Department. (Ex. 22.) 
s 
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DECISION TO UPHOLD DISCIPLINE 
The EAB determines that based on the evidence presented to it by the City and Officer Rosen, 
the disciplinary action of demotion of Officer Rosen to top step police officer with accompanying 
reduction in pay was warranted and supported by the evidence. As such, the disciplinary action taken 
by the Department and Chief Hicken are upheld. The testimony and other evidence submitted showed 
that Officer Rosen had received verbal counseling for his conduct regarding the pants incident, and that 
he was further instructed on more than one occasion by both Sgt. Cole and by Chief Hicken not to have 
contact with the co-worker other than "professional'1 contact. Officer Rosen nonetheless engaged in 
intentional contacts with the co-worker by giving her circus tickets, and his entry of the co-worker's 
name in a radio station contest for Riverdance tickets. These contacts were not "professional" contacts 
with the co-worker. Rather, the contacts made by Officer Rosen were of a personal nature and they 
were made after he was instructed to limit his contacts to professional contacts only. Officer Rosen's 
continued personal contacts with the co-worker, after having been instructed to limit his contacts to 
professional only, caused significant disruption in the Department. Officer Rosen acknowledged that 
although he was instructed to limit his contacts with the co-worker to professional contacts only, he 
failed to do so. Officer Rosen also acknowledged to his co-workers that he was accountable for his 
conduct which resulted in a demotion, and that his conduct and its consequences had caused disruption 
within the Department 
Officer Rosen's performance history included at least two IA investigations resulting in verbal 
counseling for violations of the Department's Rules and Regulations. His subsequent failure to follow 
specific instructions and the Chiefs direct orders to leave his co-worker alone and to limit his contact 
with her to professional contact only is insubordination, which is a serious offense. Officer Rosen's 
conduct created a significant disruption within the Department, and it further illustrates his poor 
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judgment, and an inability to lead others by his example. The EAB therefore agrees with the Chiefs 
decision to discipline and demote Officer Rosen. The demotion of Officer Rosen from corporal to top 
step level police officer with accompanying reduction in pay is therefore upheld insofar as the decision 
was reasonable under the circumstances, and the discipline was warranted and supported by the 
evidence. 
DATED this 10th day of May, 2011. 
Employee Appeals Board 
City of Saratoga Springs 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of May, 2011,1 hand delivered to the office of the City 
Recorder for the City of Saratoga Springs the foregoing DECISION in the Appeal of Aaron Rosen. 
Brent Call, Member 
Employee Appeals Board 
City of Saratoga Springs 
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C I T Y O F 
SARATOGA SPRINGS 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 
CHIEF GARY HICKEN 
February 16,2011 
Letter of Intent to Discipline 
On February 16, 20111 received the completed Internal Affairs investigation 11-003. The 
investigation was completed by Sergeant Cole. The investigation was supplemental to an 
on-going Internal Affairs investigation involving an incident that occurred on January 18, 2011, 
where, according to Corporal Rosen, while adjusting his clothing, his pants slipped from his 
hands and dropped down to his knees. The incident occurred in the Sergeant's office while the 
door was open and was observed by Records Clerk Soper. While Corporal Rosen claimed the 
incident was accidental, rather than immediately apologizing for the incident, Corporal Rosen 
made an inappropriate joke at Ms. Soper's expense. He was subsequently disciplined for that on 
January 28, 2011 and was verbally counseled regarding that conduct. 
After the verbal counseling, I learned additional information that led to the supplemental 
investigation, including information that Corporal Rosen had dropped his pants in front of a 
fellowr officer on at least one prior occasion. In addition, during the investigations Corporal 
Rosen was ordered by both Sergeant Cole and myself not to have any contact with Clerk Soper 
outside of professional contact and as required in the performance of his duties. On January 28, 
2011 he asked if he could apologize to Clerk Soper and I told him he could do that in a very brief 
casual way if it was acceptable to Clerk Soper. After hovering in Ms. Soper's work area for quite 
a few minutes, Ms. Soper's supervisor informed me that Ms. Soper did not wish to speak with 
him. I also informed Corporal Rosen on Wednesday, February 2, 2011 that Clerk Soper did not 
want to have a discussion with him regarding the issue in any manner including an apology. I 
ordered him at that time he should have no discussion or involvement with Clerk Soper in any 
way other than the scope of his employment. I told him he was not going to get the resolution he 
wanted and ordered him to have no contact other than professional involvement. 
O n T o n n o r r r O f\ OH 1 1 Cs\(*r\r Qr\r\P*r rp>.r>c±\x7(±r\ p tinir&i tr\ tn^» ^ I T Y M I O + h a t V»orl K/=*p»n lc*-ft- i n l i P r K n v \ i n f n 
W l l %/H-XXl-ACtA J J~,\J, X^\J X X V / i W i . l V l^V/L/V/JL i V V V l Y V / U (X U V I V V I LVJ UL1.VS V l i V U O IXXCXC XXUtVX U W i l XN*/XC XXX H V l %J\J/\. VTXLXX 
a note attached from Corporal Rosen stating c<sorry so late, enjoy." This was in violation of his 
previous directed order. On February 7, 2011 Clerk Soper had been told by Corporal Rosen she 
had won tickets to cRiverdance"from the radio station Corporal Rosen works for part time. 
Corporal Rosen confirmed that he entered Ms. Soper's name in the prize data base without her 
knowledge or consent. This was also a violation of the order which I had given him on 
February^ 2011. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Sergeant Cole's investigation and my review find the following: 
1. Corporal Rosen violated Saratoga Springs Rules and Regulations 3.15 (B) Following 
Orders/Insubordination when he placed the circus ticket in Clerk Soper's mailbox. 
2. He also violated 2.0 Personal Conduct, and 2.24 Respect for the same reason. 
3. He also violated Rules and Regulations section 3.0 Duty Requirements where he failed 
to use sound judgment for the same reason. 
4. Corporal Rosen was also found insubordinate by violating Rules and Regulations 3.15 
(B) on February 7, 2011 when he intentionally entered Clerk Soper's name in a prize data 
base without her knowledge and consent which lead to her name being announced over 
the K-Bull radio as a winner of 'Riverdance"tickets. This was also a violation of 2.0 
Personal Conduct, 2.24 Respect, and 3.0 Duty Requirements / Judgment for the same 
reason. 
The above violations were all sustained by Sergeant Cole and myself and require significant 
discipline. Therefore, it is my intent to discipline Corporal Rosen by demoting him from 
Corporal to top step Police Officer as of February 26, 2011. The salary/pay change will be 
reflected the next pay period beginning March 6, 2011. Upon that demotion he will be assigned 
to the Patrol Squad determined by Management staff. After which an action plan will be put in 
place by the supervising Sergeant. 
According to section 4.36 Pre-Disciplinary Action Procedure, you are being given written notice 
regarding the intent to discipline for the listed sections and the nature and rationale for the 
decision. According to section 4.0 of the Saratoga Springs Rules and Regulations and section 
4.56 of the City of Saratoga Springs appeal process, you have 10 days in which to request an 
appeal to this discipline. Until that decision has been made you will return to work on February 
16, 2011 and work your normal shift and are again ordered to have no contact directly or 
indirectly either on or off duty with Clerk Soper except within the scope of your employment. 
Respectfully, 
M 
Gary Hicken 
Chief of Police 
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